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In coming years, 9 May will be regarded a watershed moment in Malaysia’s 
political history; on the same level as the 13 May 1969 race riots. After 61 
years of uninterrupted rule by the Malayan Alliance, and its successor, 
Barisan Nasional (BN), the governing coalition dominated by the United 
Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and led by Malaysia’s sixth prime 
minister Najib Tun Razak lost the 14th General Election. In a devastating 
defeat, BN lost its majority in the national parliament and only retained 
two of the 12 state governments contested. BN also recorded its lowest 
share of the popular vote, capturing only 33.8 per cent (a sharp drop of 
13.6 per cent).  
What was even more incredible was the person who led the opposi-
tion alliance, Pakatan Harapan (PH, or the Alliance of Hope), to victory. 
Mahathir Mohammad, Malaysia’s longest-serving prime minister, holding 
office from 1981 to 2003 (a total of 22 years), came out of retirement, 
established a new political party, Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (PPBM), 
took over the leadership of the opposition PH, and led them into govern-
ment. He took over as leader when he was 90 years old. On 10 May 2018, 
the day he was sworn in, he was 92 years old and is now the oldest serving 
elected premier in the world.  
The magnitude of a Mahathir-led victory cannot be underestimated. 
Most experts on Malaysian politics gave Mahathir and PH little chance of 
overthrowing Najib Razak and BN. After all, Najib and BN held all the 
cards. BN, or more precisely UMNO – the dominant party in the coalition 
and backbone of BN – had unlimited financial resources, crucial for pat-
ronage and funding a multifaceted campaign. Perhaps more importantly, 
UMNO controlled all the state apparatus involved in conducting the elec-
tions, from the Electoral Commission (EC) to government departments 
responsible for patronage, intelligence, and voter registration. These or-
ganisations were openly biased in favour of BN. The EC was notorious 
for gerrymandering boundaries in favour of BN, and the electoral roll was 
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riddled with suspect voters (Chan 2018). The civil service machinery be-
haved more like the BN election machinery than a neutral institution. The 
mainstream media – all linked to the government – openly called on voters 
to reject Mahathir and support continuity under Najib. Several sultans, al-
ways a political factor in nine of Malaysia’s states, openly questioned Ma-
hathir and PH (Bhavan Jaipragas 2017). The Selangor sultan famously 
claimed that Mahathir had an “inferiority complex” (Selangor Sultan 2017). 
Mahathir was accused of selling out the Malay race; the most infamous 
headline was “DAP plan to manipulate Dr M revealed: PM” (New Straits 
Times 2018). Malays were warned that Mahathir would take away the priv-
ileges and the affirmative action enjoyed by the Malay community, and be 
beholden to the Democratic Action Party (DAP) – a Chinese-dominant 
one. In Malaysia’s highly racial political system, accusing someone of sell-
ing out their race can create significant political damage.  
On top of these factors, Najib and UMNO thought that his informal 
alliance with PAS, the Islamic party, would give them the upper hand in 
rural Malay constituencies.1 Winning these constituencies is crucial to tri-
umphing in the election overall, as they account for about half of all the 
seats in parliament. PAS had always been UMNO’s arch-enemy in the ru-
ral areas, and this was the first time since the mid-1970s that it agreed to 
cooperate with UMNO – appealing to UMNO’s political base along reli-
gious and racial grounds. Najib’s biggest weakness, the 1MDB (1 Malaysia 
Development Berhad) kleptocracy scandal, was not expected to have any 
real impact among rural Malay voters (see Teh 2018; Wright and Bradley 
2018). After all, UMNO claimed that 1MDB was “too complex” for rural 
voters to understand, and that they were interested in more “bread and 
butter” issues instead. 1MDB, thus, was labelled an urban issue (Free Ma-
laysia Today 2017). BN was projected to hold onto its core rural Malay base, 
and similarly retain its dominant position in the two states of East Malaysia, 
Sabah and Sarawak – both seen as “safe deposit states” and comprising a 
fifth of the seats to be competed over nationally. After all, BN had made 
gains in the 2016 Sarawak election, picking up seats from the opposition.  
Going into GE14, BN was, then, confident of victory. The failure of 
the opposition to win power in the previous general election of 2013 had 
dampened hopes of a change of government. The ratcheted up use of re-
pression on the part of BN in the years leading up to GE14 had fostered 
a climate of fear (Human Rights Watch 2016). Mahathir and PH were 
viewed as the underdogs. In a worst-case scenario for the ruling coalition, 

1  Hutt (2018). On cooperation, see also New Straits Times (2015) and Chin (2017). 
The process began in 2013, and extended up to GE14. 
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Najib and BN would win with a smaller majority but lose the popular 
vote.2 The possibility of a hung parliament was touted, but few besides 
those engaged in generating propaganda for the opposition believed it was 
possible as the campaign evolved – and especially sceptical were those 
within the ranks of the governing coalition itself.  
How, then, did Mahathir and PH win? This question will preoccupy 
Malaysian watchers for decades to come. In this special issue, we shed light 
on this watershed moment by looking at a range of factors contributing to 
BN’s defeat. While we do not claim that the articles here represent a de-
finitive and comprehensive overview of GE14, we nevertheless hope that 
they illuminate and help explain the many spectrums that came together 
to create, in a sense, a “perfect storm” for Mahathir and his opposition 
partners. 
7KH$UWLFOHV
This collection contains seven articles adopting different theoretical per-
spectives on GE14, and its implications for democracy. Yet what ties the 
collection together is twofold: first, the centrality of developments sur-
rounding the GE14 campaign and, second, broader societal shifts away 
from BN, be they in the dominant party UMNO itself, civil society, East 
Malaysia, or in the failures resulting from the BN development model. 
Collectively the articles suggest a rethink of electoral behaviour in Malaysia 
is necessary, as not only was the election result unexpected but there were 
also mistaken assumptions made about voting behaviour as well as under-
estimations of the impact of different factors in shaping political outcomes. 
Furthermore, while all the essays suggest that the election expanded the 
possibility of democratic governance, not least of which was a long over-
due political transition, the picture for democracy ahead is fraught with 
uncertainty and obstacles – although the respective authors vary on what 
these are and what their potential effect(s) will be.  
Ross Tapsell’s article deals with the role played by social media – in 
particular, Facebook and WhatsApp. GE14 has increasingly been labelled 
Malaysia’s “WhatsApp” election. The smartphone was used extensively to 
circumvent mainstream media and as a subversive device for disseminat-
ing anti-government messages. For all its serious flaws, social media allows 
citizens in the rural and semi-rural heartlands of Malaysia to receive alter-
native news; in GE14, the expansion of telecommunications coverage al-
lowed for even greater geographic inclusion. Facebook was the central 

2  Malaysia uses the first-past-the-post electoral system. 
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place to see images of Mahathir at rallies and watch his speeches live, but 
also for Malaysians to regularly read fervent criticism of Prime Minister 
Najib and BN. Social media was not only a space for alternative infor-
mation, but crucially also gossip, slander, jokes, and disagreements. Tapsell 
argues that this empowered the “weak,” drawing theoretically from the 
earlier pioneering work on Malaysia by James Scott (Scott 1987), and ulti-
mately advantaged the opposition in GE14. Tapsell notes, however, that 
all sides used social media and this space was heavily contested, making 
for a different campaign environment compared to previous elections and 
one in which there was greater diversity and complexity. 
Kai Ostwald, Paul Schuler, and Jie Ming Chong focuse on Malay con-
stituencies, arguably one of the most crucial arenas wherein GE14 was 
won. They argue that the electoral outcome does not upend conventional 
wisdom on the opposition’s fragmentation, but rather underscores the im-
portance of local context. The authors posit also that the pronounced re-
gionalism of Malaysian politics mitigated the impact of the local third party. 
This finding points to the need to incorporate greater difference in under-
standing regional dynamics on the ground, even within Peninsula Malaysia. 
Furthermore, they contend the elite split within UMNO provided con-
servative voters with an assurance of continuity that undermined both the 
incumbent and third-party appeals. Their analysis of vote distributions 
suggests that the new UMNO and PAS opposition will collaborate hence-
forth to increase the salience of ethnicity and political Islam, in a bid to 
build a future winning electoral bloc.  
John Funston similarly looks at the Malay vote, but his perspective is 
different. Rather than look in-depth at the 2018 results, he places his anal-
ysis in a broader historical context. He traces the challenges for BN, and 
UMNO in particular, back to the divisive 1999 election and the first Ma-
hathir era. He also examines the key decisions made by Najib before and 
after the campaign, before he analyses how UMNO performed in 2018. 
His analysis shows that GE14 was a devastating defeat for the dominant 
party. Funston argues that this had to do with long-standing issues of cor-
ruption, but also the reconfiguration of the political opposition. He posits 
PH was able to attract Malay support and thus gain the necessary seats to 
win government.  
Bridget Welsh echoes the importance of looking at vote patterns in 
her analysis of GE14. She argues that the “surprise” of the election result 
can be understood to be the consequence of the impactful role of “emo-
tion” in the messaging and mode of the election. She suggests that to un-
derstand the outcome, the role that “saviour” politics played in influencing 
voters was important – aided by an enhanced and more prominently 
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“emotional” social media campaign. She differs, however, in crediting the 
outcome to an “elite” split within UMNO or when others attribute it to 
the opposition. She posits that GE14 was, rather, a product of an “UMNO 
collapse” in which the deterioration of the party’s support was due to both 
the short- and long-term erosion of its political base notably among 
younger voters. Welsh contends that while Malaysia may have bucked 
global trends in embracing a more democratic alternative, a new govern-
ment, the forces driving political change are, in fact, quite similar to world-
wide ones. In Malaysia’s case, however, the incumbent BN bore the brunt 
of anger, political polarisation and rising inequality.  
Tsu Chong Chan takes the discussion away from the focus on the 
campaign and its results, in his article on how Bersih – Malaysia’s electoral 
reform movement – contributed to the opposition’s victory in GE14. As 
a member of the Bersih Secretariat, Chan offers a bird’s-eye view of what 
happened and how this active and important civil society group contrib-
uted to political change. Using the framework of political opportunity 
structures, Chan examines how Bersih used the 1MDB scandal, electoral 
manipulation, and the re-delineation exercise to mobilise, set the agenda, 
and to educate voters. He shows how Bersih served to put the BN gov-
ernment on the defensive, and simultaneously helped to forge opposition 
cooperation and expand the arenas of political contestation. Chan argues 
that without civil society, and Bersih in particular, the outcome witnessed 
would not have been possible. 
Muhamad Nadzri Mohamed Noor takes a different approach, as he 
opts to focus in on broader shifts in the political structure and develop-
ment policies that also contributed to the context for a PH victory. His 
analysis highlights the central role of shifts within both the ruling coalition 
and within the opposition. He argues that weaknesses in development en-
gagement ultimately contributed to BN’s defeat. 
In the final essay, James Chin looks at the campaign in the Borneo 
states of Sabah and Sarawak. He argues that, unlike on the peninsula, the 
issue of the 1963 Malaysia Agreement (MA63) was omnipresent through-
out the campaign. For the past half-century, the polity in Sabah and Sara-
wak have felt that they have lost their autonomy in many areas stipulated 
in the MA63 agreement due to the centralisation of powers by the federal 
government. This has created a strong sense of historical grievance among 
Sabahans and Sarawakians, especially the non-Muslim natives and the Chi-
nese communities. The MA63 issue combined with local factors such as 
the selection of candidates and internal party disputes as well as sabotage 
– all taken together – better reflect the experience of GE14 in Sabah and 
Sarawak. 
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